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International Research Journal of Humanities, Language and Literature (IRJHLL) is a double blind peer reviewed, refereed monthly international journal that provides publication of research papers, review papers, review articles, technical reports, mini review and short commutations articles in all areas of Humanities, Language and Literature. The Journal provides a common forum where all aspects of Humanities, Language and Literature are presented. The journal welcomes publications of high quality papers on following areas- Study of Review of Comparative Literature, Modern Literature, Creative Expressions, New Literary History, Practice and Theory of Creative Writing Literature and Language, Methodologies of Literature and Language, Theories and Practice of Literary Studies, Linguistics, Stylistics, Research and Developments In Language and Literature Education, Language and Literature Explores the Connection Between Stylistics and Critical Theory, Linguistics, Language Assessment and Language For Special Purposes, Language Planning and Policies, Conversation Analysis, Translation Studies, Sociology of Literature, Academic Exchange, Languages and Cultures, Humanities, Cross-Cultural Studies, Literary Criticism and Allied Subjects. Empirical research using primary, secondary or experimental data is also encouraged.

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FREEDOM AND FACTICITY: BEING-IN-SITUATION

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ABSTRACT

I offer a close treatment of Sartre"s analysis of freedom in Being andNothingness, which is ostensibly a tricky issue in it. I propose to reanalyse its concept of freedom, under a modified framework, that is, the concept of freedom might be understood as explaining the concept of for-itself in appropriative relation to facticity (facticité).

Key Words: *Situation, Facticity, Nihilation*

I offer a close treatment of Sartre‟s analysis of freedom in Being andNothingness, which is ostensibly a tricky issue in it. I propose to reanalyse its concept of freedom, under a modified framework, that is, the concept of freedom might be understood as explaining the concept of foritself in appropriative relation to facticity (facticité). Facticity is connection of for-itself with the in-itself, i.e., with the place, the past, environment, fellowman, birth and death. Put differently, it is a relation with given or things which the for-itself nihilates. The for-itself (pour-soi) is in midstof-the-world, it is a being-in-situation, it is there among things which are there simply, it is nothing but situation. I attempt to restructure moderately the concept of freedom principally in relation to human situation, which is an outcome of the fundamental project which the for-itself freely chooses. The upsurge of freedom cannot be separated from choice i.e., from the person herself that surpassesthings (in-itself) in light of chosen end and confers meaning on things, and situations in relation to the end. I show the interrelation between freedom and facticity of for itself. It is because of facticity, that the for-itself is able to engage, exercise its choice, and by its very engagement toward the chosen end, it reveals its freedom. I explain the for-itself is free in situation protanto, and in spite of the situation pro tantomeaning to a certain extent, the for-itself is always free, in a certain sense, from a certain point of view. In the first section, Freedom and Facticity: The Situation, I suggest facticity opens opportunities and possibilities for for-itself, besides, the for-itself in terms of facticity gives meaning to a situation, in light of the chosen end. There is no meaning outside human reality and its projects. The for-itself is possibility, hence if we choose to give meaning to existence it may not appear gratuitous. If we choose to provide life with an object, life would not appear without an object. Whatever may be the situation my situation is to choose in situation. I choose myself in situation, e.g., dominant or submissive. My choice is to see the situation in particular light and in the light of my choice, I influence the situation. A situation could also be a motive for conceiving another state of affairs in which things would be better. The day I conceive a different state of affairs, the situation is apprehended as unbearable. Sartre affirms that when I form the project of altering the situation, that the situation will be conceived as unendurable. I must not consider a situation as merely the most miserable but I must consider it in relation to an ideal nothingness from which I am separated; in relation to my chosen end which is "a state of the world to be obtained, and not yet existing"(Sartre 1992, 614). The for-itself has to illuminate her present situation in light of an ideal state of affairs which e.g. is a happiness pure and possible, a present nothingness, and nihilate it in return by saying, "I am not happy". Sartre considers that my freedom is projected ensemble of non-existents which is myself as transcendence, "it is Me in so far as I have to be myself outside of myself" (Sartre 1992, 564). The for-itself is a situation, that is, in any situation, my situation is to make a choice, make a decision. Penultimately, I would conclude.

1.FREEDOM AND FACTICITY: THE SITUATION

My class, birth, death, place, environment, my family, etc. are facts, but the fact that I cannot escape their lot, does not imply that I am not free, because for the for-itself to exist, is to choose its way of being in relation to these facts, in relation to its being there, in relation to the utility or adversity that surround me, that is, in relation to my being-in-the-world insofar as this being-inthe-world is a choice—nihilation of the factual givens. Sartre considers that my position is to give meaning to my being in the world which is a relation between existents which surround me and my facticity. This is the situation, and it is a "position apprehended by the For-itself which is in situation" (Sartre 1992, 701). The for-itself is conscious of these facts or facticity but facts cannot constitute me as being a worker or being a bourgeois. The for-itself apprehends itself as being there for nothing. It depends on me the way I apprehend my position;i.e., my situation; with respect to the existents which surround me. It is a matter of choice, and "the choice which I am—is an apprehension of thissituation here" (Sartre 1992, 706). The fact or factual given can be designated as has been and what has been is the essence; human reality seizes this essence in itself as having been. Human reality is separated from this essence by nothingness because freedom precedes essence. The project or goal is to change this given and the given appears as given in light of the end chosen. Choice implies to change the concrete given which in fact is nothing but myselfin situation. As I am separated from the brute given by nothing except by my freedom, the contingency of freedom, and the contingency of in-itself are manifested in situation by the inconstancy and adversity of environment. Whatever may be my modes ofbeing, „All my "modes of being" manifest freedom equally since they are all ways of being my own nothingness" (Sartre 1992, 574). Whatever the for-itself may be in the form of having been, the for-itself can realize a nihilating rupture with the world and with itself. The permanent possibility of this rupture is freedom according to Sartre. This nihilation is nothing but freedom. The for-itself exists as nihilation of the in-itself, and through this permanent possibility of nihilation which is precisely freedom; the for-itself is perpetually something other than what can be said of it; that is by free choice of endwhich the for-itself is not, the for-itself is its own nothingness. For Sartre, the chosen end; a project of the for-itself; is always a transcendence, and a way the for-itself chooses itself. Choice and consciousness are identical as there is nothing in consciousness which is not conscious of being. Consciousness is always conscious of its possibilities. Possibilities of consciousness exist only as consciousness of possibilities. "The possible is a structure of the for-itself" (Sartre 1992, 29).

The for-itself, Sartre asserts, is a being which implies that the for-itself makes itself by means of a possibility manifested as a value and which is associated with the being of the for-itself in the form of a project of a being which is lacking, because the for-itself is a lack of being. Lack and freedom are identical. The for-itself chooses because it is a lack of being, it is the concrete mode of being of the lack of being. Possibility, project of being and being,are one and the same thing forSartre. Concrete projects are totality of my being which reveals my choice of myself as a totality in a particular situation. "The choice of the for-itself is always a choice of a concrete situation" (Sartre 1992, 762). The for-itselfwhich is nothingnessis nothing but freedom: possibility which exists for me. Recognition of a possibility as my possibility is anguish, that is, the consciousness of being my own future anguishes me. Sartre stresses, "I am full of anguish: the slightest gesture enrages me. I can"t imagine what is required of me. Yet I must choose: I sacrifice the passage Gillet, I shall never know what it held for me" (Sartre 1965, 83). Anguish is constituted when consciousness sees itself cut from the future by its very freedom. 1. "Consciousness is being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being" (Sartre 1992, 86).It is "a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is" (Sartre 1992, 100). Which iswhat it is not

and which is not what it is" (Sartre 1992, 100). Which iswhat it is not suggests that the for-itself becomes that what itis not (future possibilized). The second part which is not what it is implies that the for-itself cannot be in the mode of being-in-itself, the way a glass is a glass or a table is a table; the for-itself makes it be as the changing of what it is. Elsewhere, to express consciousness, Sartre reverses the formulation: "It is a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not" (Sartre 1992, 17). Thus, possibilities do remain when one possibility is exhausted. I am separated by the ideal by nothing. The ideal is ideal for me because I apprehend it as real, therefore there is the constant obligation to make myself what I am. The for-itself is consciousness of possibilities because it is not an absolute plenitude, it is not an entire positivity. The for-itself is nothingness, it is not, it is non-being which is "empty of being" (Sartre 1992, 48). Being-in-itself (l'être-en-soi) is. There is no non-being at its heart. It has no negation, "it is full positivity. It knows no otherness; it never posits itself as other-than-another-being. It can support no connection with the other. It is itselfindefinitely and it exhausts itself in being" (Sartre 1992, 29). It is what it is. The density of this being is infinite. The in-itself (en-soi) exists in an "infinite compression with an infinite density" (Sartre 1992, 120), it is full of itself and no further "plenitude can be imagined" (Sartre 1992, 120); there is no emptiness in it, "not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in" (Sartre 1992, 121). On the contrary, the for-itself or consciousness never coincides with itself in a full equivalence which is that of the in-itself. The for-itself is a decompression of being. "Of this table I can say only that it is purely and simply thistable. But I can not limit myself to saying that my belief is belief; my belief is the consciousness (of) belief" (Sartre 1992, 121). Sartre notes that I cannot say my belief is belief because it cannot be immediately belief, in the sense an inkwell is an inkwell. I am not the belief, I am separated from the belief by nothing,as the object is separated from a subject. It is nothingness which haunts the for-itself and separates it from the being-in-itself. The empty distance which for-itself carries in its being is its nothingness. "The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at adistance from itself as a presence to itself (Sartre 1992, 125). The in-itself is neither possible nor impossible, it is always is. But the "for-itself is the being which determines itself to exist inasmuch as it can not coincide with itself" (Sartre 1992, 125-26). The givens do not invalidate my freedom because the for-itself is made-to-be, freedom is the being of the for-itself, nevertheless, the for itself is not its own foundation. If it was its own foundation then the for-itself could choose its being-free; it could decide not only its choice of an end but also its choice of itself as freedom. This would imply that the possibility of being-free and the possibility of not-being-free exist in a uniform manner before the free choice of freedom of the for-itself. But since the for-itself is not the foundation of its own freedom, the for-itself is "responsible for everything" (Sartre 1992, 710) except for her "very responsibility" (Sartre 1992, 710). The for-itself is free to choose, but it is not free to choose to be free.

A familiar refrain of Sartre is that, the for-itself is "condemned to be free" (Sartre 1992, 186) and to decide the existence of its being. Sartre insists that the co-efficient of adversity in world cannot be utilized as reason or evidence against freedom because there can be a free for-itself only as engaged in a world that offers profound resistance. A particular crag is neutral and awaits to be illuminated by an end which the for-itself posits. Sartre holds that, if I choose to ascend upon the crag to look over the countryside; it manifests itself as helpful, but if I choose to dislodge it, the crag would reveal itself as offering stiff resistance. It is my choice which discloses the crag in one or the other way. The crag is revealed as adverse or helpful, difficult to scale or climbable according to the end chosen. The end is a certain objective state of the world to be achieved and not yet existing. It is transcendent. "And consciousness is aware of itself in so far as it is consciousness of a transcendent object" (Sartre 1957, 40).Choice of the end—which I choose to realize—is the intention, because consciousness is consciousness of something; that is, the constitutive structure of consciousness is transcendence and

consciousness is born supported by being which is not itself" (Sartre 1992, 23). The end is not given but chosen by for-itself. "But consequently this end can be transcended only if it is separated from us at the same time that it is accessible" (Sartre 1992, 621). Realization of this end is possible when human reality engages in a resisting world. Freedom is meaningful only as engaged, committed, or involved in the free choiceof the end. In the absence of adversity freedom loses all meaning as the for-itself would have no choice to engageherself in a resisting world. Sartre maintains, "Life has a meaning if you choose to give it one" (Sartre 1965, 162). Adversity does not endanger freedom rather it reveals freedom of the for-self. "In fact we are a freedom which chooses, but we do not choose to be free.... If, therefore, freedom is defined as the escape from the given, from fact, then there is a fact of escape from fact. This is the facticity of freedom" (Sartre 1992, 623). The fact that human reality is not being able not to be free is the facticity of human reality or freedom, and the fact that human reality is not free not to exist is contingency of for-itself. Thus the for-itself, as Sartre is ever reiterating, is not free to exist as not-free. This contingency of freedom is the situation which the for-itself discovers in the midst of the world. „The for-itself is, in so far as it appears in a condition which it has not chosen, as Pierre is a French bourgeois in 1942, as Schmitt was a Berlin worker in 1870; it is in so far as it is thrown into a world and abandoned in a "situation"; .... It is in so far as there is in it something of which it is not the foundation—its presence to the world‟ (Sartre 1992, 127). Sartre also affirms: "the situation is the organized totality of the being-there, interpreted and lived in and through being-beyond. Therefore there is no privileged situation.....there is no situation in which the for-itself would be more free than in others" (Sartre 1992, 702). Sartre persuasively argues that if my situation is to scale the rock, the rock would appear scalable or notscalable, but for a simple traveller the crag may appear either as aesthetic or grotesque. So, it is in the light of end chosen, that is, if the rock is integrated by freedom in a situation of which the general theme is climbing, then, the rock would appear as offering resistance. Thus the given, the in-itself (crag), is manifested as recalcitrant or aid, in the light of the projecting freedom which illumines the in-itself. Hence, there is freedom only in situation, and there is situation only through freedom. "Situation leaves mefree to pursue this or that end. One might say even that this situation conditions my freedom in this sense, that the situation is there in order not to constrain me" (Sartre 1992, 624-25). Resistances and obstacles receive meaning through free choice of human reality in relation to chosen ends. The for-itself apprehends itself as being there for nothingto choose the meaning of its situation.

In an esteemed work The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Satre, Jonathan Webber contends, "When Sartre claims that a human being „is not what it is‟,....he is indeed claiming that we are not identical with our facticity" (Webber 2009, 47). Webber, suggests ambivalence in Sartre‟s conceptualization of freedom. He argues that for Sartre not all human actions are free and at the same time all our actions are rooted in projects which are freely chosen and maintained. In Webber‟s view Sartre‟s freedom indicates a modification in the project of for-itself as simply indeterminate, and incidental. But, Sartre illustrates in example of the gambler that there is nothingness which separates the gambler from himselfand gambling, and there is no role of chance in the decision of the gambler. "The not-gambling is only one of my possibilities, as the fact of gambling is another of them, neither more nor less" (Sartre 1992, 70). The very possibility of changing the project is the very condition of the possibility of maintaining it and the very meaning of the freedom of pour-soi. The gambler is freeto choose in his situation; his present choice of not gambling or gambling does not depend on his past choices of gambling, he can make his decision ex nihilo. Sartre discusses another example. „I have been "wanting to write", but nothing, not even what I have been, can compel me to write it. Finally, I must discover the nothingness which separates me from what I shall be: I discover that the permanent possibility of abandoning the book is the

very condition of the possibility of writing it and the very meaning of my freedom‟ (Sartre 1992, 75). Thus I am, by my own choice my being, and meaning comes from me and not from outside of me. The for-itselfis a choice; there is no other meaning other than,what the for-itself chooses to give. It is an apprehension of a situation in whatever way thefor-itself chooses to apprehend. In Age of Reason,Mathieu insists, “All I want is...to retain my freedom”(Sartre 1986, 107) and Jacques declares, “that freedom consisted in frankly confronting situations into which one had deliberately entered and accepting all one‟s responsibility” (Sartre 1986, 107).

Footnotes

1. Kate Kirkpatrick in her admirable work Sartre on Sin:Between Being and Nothingness explains Sartre‟s notion of nothingness in light of the Christian doctrine of original sin and evil. She writes, “nothingness is an alias of sin and evil” (9). But for Sartre beingis and nothingnessis not.The for-itselfis freedom and “must assume the situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it” (Sartre 1992, 707-08). Or as when Orestes says that “There was nothing left in heaven, no right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders” (Sartre 1989, “I am my freedom” (Sartre 1989, 117). I acknowledge many contemporary readers have tackled Sartre‟s freedom and related concepts, of which a few are: Elizabeth Butterfield, Manon Garcia, Sonia Kruks, Kathryn Sophia Belle, Michael Monahan, Ronald Aronson, Katherine Morris, David Reisman, Peter Poellner, Christine Daigle, Christian Onof, Betty Cannon, Christina Howells, Diane Enns, Christina Landry,etc.

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A Study of John Braine's Room at the Top as a 'Pseudo Protest Novel'

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ABSTRACT

The present research paper is an attempt to explore the concept of 'Pseudo-Protest novel" by analyzing John Braine's well-known novel Room at the Tap. This novel was published in 1957, and was exceptionally successful. It is a novel which epitomizes its age. It probes deeply and tellingly into a central problem of the times. Braine's Joe Lampton, the protagonist of the novel, is a creation of the post war British welfare state. Joe is a working class origin who is pitted against the indifference and insensitivity of the rich class. He comes before us in the novel as a working class Youngman of 25 –who is said to have lost his parents in a bomb blast during the second world war- and is now living with his aunt and her family in Dufton, a small town. He has served in the army as a pilot. He is a handsome Youngman who was once a considerable boer. What turns him into a rebel are his aspirations to rise high, lack of opportunities, resultant failure, and frustration, alienation and loneliness. But his anger is different from Osborne's Jimmy Porter who withdraws – from society to hurl abuses at it. In fact, Joe Lampton gets even with the society by obtaining it and out doing its members by becoming a successful "Zombie" himself, with an extremely hectic beginning, Braine introduces Joe as an ambitious Angry Young Man of 1950, always agitated and irritated with or without reason with the creamy layer of society. Braine holds up to ridicule the vague impotent protest of these angry young men as they were always in a hurry to capture not only wealth, power, name and prestige but also rich beautiful sexy girls and that too in the shortest span of time.

Full Paper:

From post - war Britain emerged the syndrome of the angry young man, one apparently intent on overthrowing established social conventions and the codes of behavior. In the theatre, John Osborne's Look Back in Anger set the pace, and in fiction, John Braine's novel Room at the Top(1957). With Jack Clayton's film of the Braine novel, the syndrome became known internationally and the central character of the novel, Joe Lampton, became the epitome of the restless young Englishman fed up with social traditions that made life forever, one situated in the lower or middle class. All this shappened because towards the end of the 1940's the world had experienced two world wars and their resulting frustration and suffocation. Despair and disillusionment, frustration and failure, became the destiny of the post-war world. There imbalance in each and every sphere of lifewhether it was social, or moral, or economic, or political. In this atmosphere of total despair anddoubt, a group of young writers mostly from the working class or the lower middle class, emerged on the literary surface. This whole decade (1950's) of despair and frustration is termed as "The Angry Decade" by Kenneth Allsop in his book The "Angry Young Man" group includes writers like Kingsley Amis, John Braine, William Cooper, John Waine, Peter Towry, John Osborne and many others. These writers took up working class heroes and dealt with their social, economic and sexual predicament in a stratified society that resisted social change and mobility. The protagonists of these novelists are not really angry as Fredrick Karl puts it:

They are however, disgruntled – with themselves, with their social status, with their work, with their colleagues, with the shabbiness of daily life, with their frustrated aspirations for self fulfillment, with

the competitive spirit, with the inaccessibility of women and drink, with all the small activities whose pursuit takes up their depletedspirit.

These novels are generally called "Protest Novels" as they are written against the balanced social establishment. Here, the arrow of criticism is mainly towards the hypocrisy of upper class society. However, the protest of these protagonists lack moral substance and it seems that these protagonists merely want comfort or perhaps power and their rebellion is actually the manifestation of their egoism. Kenneth Allsop writes in this context, "They do not rebel for the sake of society. They are in fact nauseated by the moral demands that society makes upon them"(52).

John Braine's famous novel Room at the Top (1957), like Osborne's Look Back in Anger and Amis's Lucky Jim, is considered as young man's protest against the contemporary society. Joe Lampton, the protagonist of the novel, is a typical product of our own times. He comes before us in the novel as "a 'natural hero-un-hero, tongue-tied in all beyond materialist values" (Tibble 211). As Braine's brain-child, he seems to announce most clearly the philosophy of the times." (Albert 574).'The novel depicts the hero's protest against the capitalistic society where the rich are becoming more rich and the poor more poor. But if we examine the novel carefully, we find that it is not a pure protest novel in the true sense of the word. Because true protest is not a hollow opposition against the partial social norms. On the contrary it must have some moral standards of its own. For instance, if a person protests against corruption in the modem society it does not mean that his protest is just for the sake of protest and that he himself is allowed to indulge in the same corruption and exploit the society. Such kind of protest would be nothing but just a false accusation that has been leveled for his own selfish ends. And this is what happens in Room at the Top which is only a pseudo - protest novel. Here, the so called hero Joe Lampton pretends to hate the upper class but does not miss a single chance to become like theme can evaluate this point on various levels. But before doing so, we must keep in mind what Kenneth Allsop says in this regard:

An angry man, if his protest is to have significance, must react in terms beyond his own wants and dislikes. When he is angry or when he rebels — he must stand for something significant.(75)

Therefore, when we think of protest on behalf of a larger group and not for himself. But this does not happen in case of Joe Lampton. When we first meet him, he seems to be a true representative of working class people as he exposes the hypocrisy of the upper class society. He and his friend Charles give the label of "Zombie" to all those upper class people who have all comforts of life. Theycategorize these "Zombies" according to their status and money. Joe leaves Dufton because he never wants to be like these hypocritical Zombies. On the very first page of the novel he warns himself saying, "No more Zombies, Joe, no more Zombies".

But after reaching Warley, this voice of social protest turns into the voice of his personal selfish ends. The question of social protest goes into hell and Joe falls morally and spiritually to fulfillhis own selfish desires. When the novel starts, he is full of hatred for the rich but towards the end of the novel, he himself becomes one of them—the most "Successful Zombie".

The second argument is that Joe Lampton' s protest is merely a pretension. When he was in Dufton, every rich man was his enemy and he had a sympathetic attitude towards the lower class of society. But after reaching Warley, Dufton, his native town becomes "Dead Dufton, Dirty Dufton, Dreary Dufton,

Despicable Dufton". The glamour of Warley blinds him and the life lived in Dufton seems to him the most hellish one. He says, "It was as if all my life I'd been eating sawdust and thinking it was bread.

Thus as soon as he steps in Warley, he is full of hatred not only for his native place but also for its poor people. He even feels insulted in meeting his poor aunt Emily and uncle Dick had looked after him after his parent's death. Joe himself admits:

I was too much T'Top now, and half
- hating myself for it, I found myself
seeing them as foreigners. They were
kind and good and generous; but they
were not my sort of people any longer."

Thus we can't call him a protester as he hates his own poor people. Of course, the novel is a protest but not on the behalf of the poor masses but only a protest on Joe's own behalf. Moreover, the action of a protest novel must invariably focus our attention on the consciousness of a group through an individual's consciousness. Since the individual does not find the society acceptable, he questions the validity of its laws and conventions and this he does angrily. Joe Lampton also illustrates the difficulties of the slow rise to the Top for one who has the will and desire to succeed, But the tragedy is that his whole desires and consciousness are self-centered.

Further, Joe is like those preachers who know just to preach but never take the burden to follow it themselves. He hates the capitalists for their money - mindedness but he himself is no more than an opportunist and schemer, who is convinced that ability is not the key to advancement; he sets his sights on marriage to Susan Brown, the daughter of local industrialist and community leader. He marries Susan not because he loves her but because she is the means for his materialistic hunger. Therefore, when he tells Charles that he loves Susan, Charles exposes his reality and says, "In love with her! Drivel! In lust with her. And Daddy's bank balance. I know you, you scoundrel!" (88). Joe himself admits this reality as he says:

I was taking Susan not as Susan but as a
Grade A lovely lady: as the daughter of
a factory owner, as the means of obtaining
the key to Aladdin's cave of my ambitions.(173)

And it is for this greed of money and status that Joe sacrifices not only his own real self but also the pure and tender love of Alice. Alice remains the victim of Joe's sexual as well as emotional gratifications and finally commits suicide. After her death Joe's hollow nature becomes crystal clear. As before coming to Warley Joe has a notion that the upper class people are emotionally dead and nothing matters to them except money. He tells Charles, "Zombies lose people like a parcel or a glove. And they can't bear to talk of it or to be reminded of it. They are dead already."(19)

But Joe is no better than these Zombies in anyway when he himself passes Alice's just as a "loss of a parcel." No doubt he feels himself "homeless" thereafter and expresses deep remorse but this remorse becomes when he marries Susan just after some time. Can we call such a murderer a protester? Obviously not. Similarly Joe categorises some of the Zombies as "Sex-starved Zombies"and

Adulterous Zombies". But peeping into skirts and blouses is a temptation that he can never resist himself. Love is lust for him and he starts thinking of taking off clothes and bed as soon as he sees a girl. About Susan he says:

I imagined her nakedness, young and firm
and fragrant . . . Even when I let my eyes
rest on the outline of her firm, small
breasts beneath her sweater, it was with
a trace of lasciviousness.(57)

Finally, the protest novel places the hero's responses in a critical perspective and gives ironic treatment to his anxieties and tensions. But here, there seems no touch of satire and criticism in John Brains' tongue when he depicts Joe's immoral journey towards the top. Lee James appropriately observes "Braine's apprehension of his heroes for worldly goods is acute and exact"52.

In this way, we find that Joe's protest against the capitalistic society is merely a protest for his own sake. There is no consideration of a larger group. How can a person talk about hypocrisy, shame, and hollowness of the upper class when he himself possesses these faults in full abundance? Such a protester has no right to criticize social existence when he himself is hardly better than it. The novel could still be called a protest novel if the author had given Joe's journey to the Top a satirical treatment. Thus the protest in the novel is a protest without dignity as here neither the hero, nor the author seems to suggest any substitute for the suffocating circumstances that they have been criticizing all along. Moreover, it is not the remedy that you yourself should indulge in the evil to protest against it. We can only sympathize with an irresponsible bohemian and accept Joe's protest just because he represents the working class people who are forced to sell their souls in order to succeed and reach the Top. The novel seems to argue that poverty can not be descent; the poor can not afford moral surplus and goodness as John Brain himself writes in the novel, "It's astounding how often golden hearts and silver spoons in the mouth go together."(10)

In conclusion, we may say that Room at the Top is not a novel of protest because for all his protestations, Joe is hollow from within. He is a cad and hedonist. He wants to be other than himself, lose himself in the world of on going concerns, a car, a beautiful girl, and a room at the top. He gives up Dufton for the glamour of Warley and succeeds in hooking a rich girl, even impregnating her so that he could make his way to the top of the world. Nevertheless he loses himself in the process. And it is in the end when Alice commits suicide that he comes to realize the enormous cost that he has to pay for a room at the Top: The world still wants to console him but Joe remains inconsolable. Thus, the novel is a lesson for those who lose themselves for becoming other than themselves. It conveys the idea that poverty can not be an excuse for the moral downfall of a person as one can not sweep morality beneath the carpet of money. In short, the novel is not a protest against capitalistic society but a protest against the blind pursuit of a person towards false glamour and materialism.

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Positioning Women in Diaspora

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Migration has long been part of human history and has always entailed the creation of multiple affiliations and identities. In an interview with Susheila Nasta, Salman Rushdie refers to the process of migration as "the actual condition of change through movement"(Nasta 149). The poet Meena Alexander speaks of it as: "A harmony that underwrites apoetics of dislocation where multiple places are jointed together, the whole lit by desire that recuperates the past, figures forth the future" (Alexander 15). The diasporic identity is defined by choosing selves. In other words, identity in diaspora is transformed and redefined into novel nexus of relationships available in new circumstances. This becomes doubly problematic for women. Women have to negotiate identities which can be just endurance at first that can lead to renewal and empowerment later on. Though the loss of roots is there for all diasporic individuals, but leaving home also gives rise to new frameworks of engagement, interaction and space for women. It is the kind of freedom and identity which would not have been possible in the homelands. Edward Said makes a point that a condition of marginality, stemming from being an expatriate or exile "frees you from having always to proceed with caution, afraid to overturn the applecart, anxious about upsetting fellow members of the same corporation" (Bayoumi and Rubin 380). Homi K. Bhabha, one of the seminal scholars of diaspora theory, in his influential and widely disseminated essay, "Border Lives: The Art of the Present" (1994), argues that:

It is the trope of our times to locate the question of culture in the realm of the beyond….The „beyond" is neither a new horizon, nor a leaving behind of the past…in the fin de siècle, we find ourselves in the moment of transit where space and time cross to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion. (Bhabha 01-02)

Bhabha is one of the originators of the contemporary discourse of „narrative"constructions that arise from the „hybrid" interactions emerging from transnational existenceand cosmopolitan consciousness:

It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated….Terms of cultural engagement, whether antagonistic or affiliative, are produced performatively. The representation of difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition. The social articulation of difference…is a complex, on---going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation (Bhabha 02-03).

Identity is a psychologically fixed position that is approved by the society or assumed by the individual himself/herself. Whenever there is an issue of cultural crisis, the question of relationship and position of individual with society becomes prominent. It is particularly true in case of the Third World societies which are many as well as varied. The common thread between these societies is that mostly they are the post-colonial and developing nations present on a point where the legacies of colonialism, tradition and modernity are in direct conflict with each other. The structure of each and every Third World society is shaped by distinct social, cultural, religious, economic and political factors. However, all discussions about the position of women in these societies direct our attention towards their doubly marginalised

status. Mere presentation of women as oppressed without further analysing the case is futile. The very term "women‟s problem" is problematic because of the differences of classes, cultures, races, castes and religions, thus, giving rise to multifaceted challenges. Judith Butler remarks that in the Third World societies power is exercised through the process of homogenization and systematization of the oppression of women. „Diaspora‟ hastraditionally been understood as a yearning for a lost home. Steven Vertovec explains that theoverall Jewish history of displacement has embodied the longstanding, conventional meaning of diaspora. Martin Baumann indicates that there have been at least three inherent, and rather different referential points with respect to what we refer to as the Jewish (or any other group‟s) historical experience „in the diaspora‟. That is, when we say something has taken place „in the diaspora‟ we must clarify whether we refer to (a) the process of becoming scattered, (b) the community living in foreign parts, or (c) the place or geographic space in which the dispersed groups live. "The kind of conceptual muddle that may arise from the failure to distinguish these dimensions with regard to historical Jewish phenomena continues to plague the many emergent meanings of the notion of diaspora" (Vertovec 02-03). Vertovecfurther elaborates that in the contemporary context, interpretations of migration as loss ofhome and familiars are no longer current and instead have given way to ideas of diaspora ascommunities of simultaneously local and pluralistic identities, ethnic and transnationalaffiliations and celebrations of cosmopolitanism:

Diaspora discourse has been adopted to move collective identity claims and community self--ascriptions beyond multiculturalism… The alternative agenda – now often associated with the notion of diaspora –advocates the recognition of hybridity, multiple identities and affiliations with people, causes and traditions outside the nation state of residence (Vertovec 05).

In the context of current diaspora discourse, led by scholars such as Bhabha and Vertovec, „diaspora‟ can be viewed today as a „place‟ which can create multiplicities of cosmopolitanism, produced and reproduced through communities of people moving physically or conceptually between spaces, albeit through a chaotic order. In such a context „diaspora‟ may be a socio-cultural label applied to populations that, intentionally, do not occupy conventional territory. They may, thus, be considered „de-territorialized‟ or „reterritorialized‟ when they move from an original land to an adopted one and build expatriate or ethnic enclaves in the land of their adoption. Their emotional, social and cultural affiliations transect borders of nation--states and, indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that they form global communities across geographical, political, social and cultural boundaries. Vertovec refers to diaspora as „social form‟ and a „type of consciousness‟ (Vertovec 07). He suggests that diasporic populations retain a collective memory or vision of their original homeland and continue to relate personally or vicariously to that vision. It follows that their conscious identity is importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship. Extrapolating on this idea of diaspora as social consciousness, contemporary feminist diasporic scholar, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, speaks of a „feminism without borders‟ in which diaspora is border-crossing. She argues for a trans-cultural, feminist identity that seeks: "The simultaneous plurality and narrowness of borders and the emancipatory potential ofcrossing through, with, and over these borders" (Mohanty 02). To these scholars diaspora does not imply universality but the movements of ideas, images and people, who carry ideas and memories with them.

The notion of diaspora especially for women, as a concept of „emigration‟ (a voluntary movement away from an original centre and towards a specific chosen destination, based on the hope for a better life in that destination), rather than „dispersion‟ (forced removal from a locus, implying lack of choice and

resulting in widespread wandering, as in the dispersion of the Jewish peoples, the original Diaspora), has evolved to signify an identity space that words such as „exile", „migrant", „immigrant", „alien", „refugee" and „foreigner"cannot claim. For women it is doubly problematic. In its contemporary usage, „diaspora"indicates movement and dynamism, origin and belonging, community and culture, along with loneliness and isolation, collective nostalgia and community memory. In "Imaginary Homelands" Salman Rushdie writes:

The word „translation" comes, etymologically, from the Latin for „bearing across". Having been borne across the world, we are translated men. It is normally supposed that something always gets lost in translation; I cling, obstinately, to the notion that something can also be gained. (Rushdie 16)

There are of course differences in men"s writing of the immigrant experience from women"s, so it is not a coincidence that Rushdie says, "Having been borne across the world, we are translated men" (emphasis mine). This is because the particular forms of loss and yearning articulated in much of diasporic literature relate to the experience of men as men, as sons, husbands and fathers. I have explored ideas of borders and the borderless as they are expressed by the diasporic authors. I argue that the simultaneous containment and porousness of borders, and the idea of borderlessness that the two novels explore, offer an arena within which it is possible to construct creative, cosmopolitan and plural identities for diasporic women. The traditional immigrant discourses of alienation and loss can be subverted by women, liberating them from established norms and allowing them the space to review the social fault lines, conflicts, differences, fears and challenges that make up their traditional roles, thereby interrogating the very roles themselves.

Mohanty refers to the "emancipatory potential" of border crossings, suggesting that "a feminism without borders must envision change and social justice" (Mohanty 02). This idea is relevant when discussing emerging identity constructs which are manifestly without borders and thus without the lines of familial and cultural demarcation and division. At the same time, this dissertation argues that the nature of both the border crossing and its aftermath vary greatly with rooted experiences of class, and thus, the nature of the new freedoms varies as well.

The migration of women is propelled by their unquestioning acceptance of the social norms that define their destinies; but their quiet acquiescence is turbulently challenged by the overwhelming experience of their compulsive migration. Perhaps the most significant aspect that distinguishes narratives of male migration from female migration is choice.

Women are not the primary agents of emigration – the diasporic experience is one that is forced on them by the circumstances of their choiceless marriages – but they emerge, through this experience, as evocative symbols of a new and aspirational, more justly ordered society. Chandra Talpade Mohanty argues that "being a woman has political consequences in the world we live in; that there can be unjust and unfair effects on women depending on our…marginality and/or privilege" (Mohanty 03). Diasporic novelists Monica Ali and Jhumpa Lahiri propose that the absence of the boundaries of home, lost through exile, permits the vision for transformation and hence the creation of modern, contextual, identities.Estranged from the known comfort of traditional boundaries and constantly yearning for their lost home, Lahiri"s and Ali"s heroines tenaciously cling to the idea of creating a home such as they have known, but the omnipresence of foreignness and the necessity of grappling with its influence renders this act a creative reconstruction, liberating it from circumscribed limits.The diasporic identity is often

about choosing between selves. In other words, identity, in the process of diaspora, is transformed and translated into a new system of relationships that gives diasporans an alternative position from which to re-formulate their visions of the local and global.

Monica Ali‟s Brick Lane and Jhumpa Lahiri‟s The Namesake chronicle the lives of two women who are reluctant immigrants by marriage but who navigate the „un-belonging‟and „in-betweenness‟ of their stark, lonely lives, to make singular contributions to the ideathat women‟s immigrant identity can be potentially creative, critical and liberating. Bothnovels present immigration as an ultimately empowering experience but both also draw theirsubstance from the brutal alienation that the protagonists suffer in the act of creating theirnew interstitial selves. The protagonists of these novels Nazneen and Ashima both share the classic „insider‟/„outsider‟ perspectives of immigrants and both narrate the experiences of alterity. The lived difference of their lives alters even their physical spaces; thus Brick Lanein London (Ali) and Cambridge in Massachusetts (Lahiri), which are initially depicted as alien, are, through the course of the novels, transformed into spaces chosen as homes by the protagonists. Indeed it could be argued that it is precisely Nazneen‟s and Ashima‟s positions as „insiders‟/‟outsiders‟ that permit the double-consciousness which allows them to cross borders of various kinds. The idea of choosing an identity, defined by context and culture, rather than inheriting one, is increasingly finding support among contemporary social thinkers who are themselves products of this hybridization. Nobel Laureate economist, humanist and diasporic, Amartya Sen, suggests that:

History and background are not the only way of seeing ourselves and the groups to which we belong…identities are robustly plural,and…the importance of one identity need not obliterate the importanceof others. (Sen 19)

While this may be seen as an argument from a position of privilege, since many people in the world cannot think to pick, choose and pluralize their identities at will, it is thisnotion of plurality that Lahiri and Ali use to frame the growing agency of their protagonists.The heroines through their experience of exile, develop the consciousness that their identitiesare less a matter of origin and more an issue of choice. Sen suggests that “substantialfreedom” is necessary to decide “what priority to give to the various identities we maysimultaneously have… Life is not mere destiny” (Sen 38-39). The control of agency overdestiny is the trajectory that the authors chart for their two protagonists, building through thenovels a narrative of gathering freedom.

Female diasporic novelists speak to their own positions as authors inhabiting interstitial spaces, as much as to those of their characters, when they present identity as a malleable social construct in their novels. Consequently, it can be said that creating identity isa dynamic performative act through the actions of their lead protagonists. Both novels thematize and enact processes of fictional transformation as women in diaspora traverse their changing circumstances and move from positions of voiceless passivity to greater self knowledge and independence. The relevance of this narrative of identity as a dynamic performative refers to the extent to which the protagonists in the two novels actively construct their own identities through their circumstances of migration. Female characters, far from being the agents of migration, are traumatized migrants; but the experience of migration liberates them from the known and familiar boundaries and enables them to create new, contemporary, cross-cultural identities, shaped by their gender and class location. One can view women‟s identity within the diaspora as a realm of dynamic dialogue. The energy created by that dialogue propels a re-interpretation of gender roles and promotes a gendered vision of diasporic identity.

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THE GENRES OF HISTORY AND THEIR RELEVANCE: THE CASE OF WOMEN HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

The reconstruction of human activities in the period before writing making up for damaged and lost achieves, collation and interpretation of extant materials, the period of writing and other related problems have been addressed by disciplines from different angles. For the discipline of history these genres result from an epistemological decision which is ontologically made manifest through the created genres. These created genres are intended to inject a new meaning and truth into the past, and add new genres to pre-existing ones like social history, political history, economic history and intellectual history. Recent developments have resulted in the emergence of new genres including ethnic history, race history, gender history and women history to mention a few. The paper attempts to analyse the emergence of this genre and its relevance to the discipline and the society at large, in view of the neglect of women in historical discourse being a function of the ideas about historical significance which has been defined primarily by power, influence and visible activity in the world of political and economic affairs. The paper concludes that history as written and perceived so has been the history of the minority. With the majority finding a place in history, the discipline has moved to be comprehensively history: his-story and her-story.

Key Words: *Gender History, Women History, Genre, Historical Discourse, Reconstruction*

Introduction

Cleo, the muse of history is now a liberated woman. No longer does she accept the traditional norms which defined certain themes as her proper pursuit. One now finds those she inspires investigating all manner of peculiar topics – mobs, magic, madness, famines, families and funny papers are only a few of the new topics intriguing historians. In the meantime, new techniques as diverse as quantification and psychoanalysis are being used by some historians. Traditional scholars have frequently expressed doubts that much good could come out of all this innovation and as women history makes its appearance and claims recognition as a legitimate new field of research, they must wonder still more about the future of their discipline. Surely,the study of women must be the ultimate harbinger of scholarly chaos. What could have less todo with the "serious" study of social change? Scholars suffering from the lingering "Victorianism" might feel that women are too eternal or unworldly to have much to do with politics and economics. Others might wonder whether topicality isn"t the sole reason for the increasing attention paid to the history of women.1

Why women history? Because women have a history too. For too long, the history of half the human race has been ignored. We need to know our past to understand our present since the present is the product of the past we have been alarmingly ignorant of. To explain for examplethe subordinate position of women in most societies,the narrowly defined female role, the attitude of men towards women, the lowesteem in which women hold themselves etc. we need to look backwards to the origins and development of ills. From a study of ancient society for example, we can question the notion that patriarchy was the only organizational style ever known. Not only can the past explain the present but

acknowledgment of that past can also prove a source of strength encouragement and admonition to women.

Almost from its inception, the historical profession has been dominated by male practitioners. In 1921, Arthur Schlesinger commented that it should not be forgotten that all our great historians have been men and were likely therefore to be influenced by sex on the interpretation of history unconsciously.2 the vast majority of books on women centred on the theme of Women‟s intrinsic goodness, badness or etiquette for women. Some of the books argued that women as embodiment of the eternal feminine had always provided the necessary support for the more visible achievement of men throughout history. This in itself was an orientation which was fatal to balance scholarly treatment.

The nineteenth century ushered in organized feminism which began to challenge patriarchal structures of power in politics, academia etc. especially in America and England. The response of these efforts saw women particularly the famous ones as trouble makers.3as women have confronted many difficulties as they attempt to gain scholarly credibility and respect from male historian. The intellectual and social isolation imposed by sexual discrimination has been a powerful deterrent to sustained scholarly and professional activity. Until 1970 there were few academic women historians at the rank of full professor.4

In 1973,the title of a new university course in Paris, Do Women have a History," converted perhaps the general state of women‟s history, but it also marked the beginning of a trend towards a much more receptive climate for women‟s history – the development of historical studies of the family, sexuality and the history of everyday ideas and behaviours. On the whole, however, women‟s history through the 1970s and into the early 1980‟s was largely treated as marginal.5

While traditional historiography had tended to excluded women from a „universal‟ history which was rendered in male voices,the development of women‟s centred investigation of the 1970s has passed through some stages as the search for conceptual framework and methodology appropriate to the field is on-going. It began with „compensatory history‟ or „women worthies‟ and then it moved to contributory history.6By the end of 1970s, it had moved to „transitory history,‟7a period Joan Kelly noted that women‟s history had begun to restore women to history and to restore our history to women, but more than this, it had also began to stimulate the questioning of the most basic foundation of historical study.8

By women history or her-story the paper means a reconstruction, a retrieval of women‟s experiences, expression, ideas, actions, and their on-going functioning in a male dominated world on their own terms. In this context, the question of oppression alone does not elicit this history, as it is a useful but limited tool of analysis for women history.

The Relevance of Women History

History is a flexible discipline with the ability to facilitate an ever wider exploration of the ever expanding even though already vast field of knowledge. History relevance is seen in its innovativeness readiness to confront the problems of the day as soon as they rear their heads. Economic history is that genre of history which seeks to relate economic growth and society‟s development to its total historical experience; political history is personality focused, concerning itself with primarily the lives and actions of kings and queens, nobles and rulers; social history with the life of human society, their

interactions with one another, their culture and tradition and the way these have affected the course of human development; Intellectual history with the ideas and thoughts of individuals on specific issues of life.The relevance of women‟s history is multi-faceted. The following relevance are worthy of mention.

Firstly, Women‟s history presents a challenge to the periodization of traditional history. The periods in which basic changes occur in society and which historians have commonly regarded as turning points for all historical developments, are not necessarily the same for men as for women. The traditional time frame in history has been derived from political history. Since women have been long excluded from political and military developments the irrelevance of this periodization to their historical experiences is obvious. How then can the challenge of periodization be tackled? This is one of the many questions that challenge the universal assumptions of all previous historical categories.9

Secondly, all conceptual models of history developed have only limited usefulness for women‟s history, since all are based on the assumptions of a patriarchal ordering of values. The structural –functionalist framework leaves out class and sex factors, the traditional Marxist framework leaves out sex and race factors as essentials, admitting them only as marginal factors.10 Women‟s history has already presented a challenge to some of the basic assumptions and vaunted generalizations that historians have made over time. While most historians are aware of the fact that their findings are not value free and are trained to check their biases by a variety of methods, most are yet unaware of their sexist bias and more importantly, of the sexist bias which pervades the value system, the cultures and the very language within which they work.11

Thirdly, with women history new themes have been introduced into historical studies and old ones subjected to revisionist interpretation.12 Focus has shifted steadily away from a preoccupation with the need to rediscover and render visible the contribution of heroines and women reformers from the past. By the 1980‟s, women historians were focusing less upon the history of women‟s place and female misfortune and were taking interest in social process which included women‟s culture, women‟s experience, trying to be more sensitive to matters of class, ethnicity and race as well gender and sexual orientation. In the words of Pascale Werner “women‟s history was the attempts to draw up anew geography, a historical landscape in which feminist research could lead historians to people‟s space in different ways and move the boundaries around.”13

To achieve this, women‟s history is interdisciplinary in its methodology- tools for analysis. One of the method s of approaching historical materials is asking about the actual experiences of women in the past. This is different from a description of the conditions of women written from the perspective of male sources, and leads one to the use of women‟s letters, diaries, and autobiographies. Oral histories have also been embraced as the key method of recovering women‟s experiences and voices from andro-centric notions, assumptions and biases which dominate „male-stream‟ history everywhere to a female oriented consciousness which has resulted in challenging new interpretations. As J. Reinharz has put it, “women‟s oral history is feminist encounter because it creates new materials about women, validates women‟s experiences, enhances communication among women, discovers women‟s root and develops apreviously denied sense of continuity.14

Fourthly, women history has brought to the fore the omission of children and related aspects of family life, as an object of not only for the study of women but also for the study of people‟s history. The very obvious link between the private world of the home and the public world of affairs makes the neglect of

this study more obvious. Adolf Hitler states clearly the link between the world of the home and the state, within patriarchal society thus:If we say the world of the men is the state, the world of the man is his commitment, his struggle on behalf of his community; we could then perhaps say that the world of the woman is a smaller world. For her world is her husband, her family, her children and her home. But where will the big world be if no one wanted to look at the small world? How could the big world continue to exist, if there was no one to make the task of caring for the small world at the centre of their lives? No, the big world rest upon the small world! The big world cannot survive if the small world is not secure.15

Fifthly, in recent times, the question of diversity, of differences between and among women stands as a continuing and thorny theoretical problem for women histories. While some women historians continue to conceptualize women as a unitary category which can be recognized and describe in history, there are others including Chandra TalpadeMohanty and Cheryl Johnson-Odim,16who insist that this unity tends to ignore the many differences and divides women? This is so since women do not all have the same history.

Women‟s history has brought to the discipline a frame of reference that builds women experiences of differences from women and differences among women,17since Christian Crosby, has warned that "as long as women are seen in terms of their sameness, rather than their difference, women history will remain within the space of formation of a male historical discourse."18 A glossary look at historical materials over the ages has tended to view/treat all men as the same. With this realization, women‟s history has come to include critical accounts of women in every race, class and culture as black feminist like Bonnie Thornton have critique the value of portraying a racially and culturally homogenous "woman-who is in reality a white bourgeois, western woman… as the agent of a more progressive history and culture."19

Hence, important among attempts to reconfigure the field of history and gender relations have been recent efforts to encourage the writing of histories from below and to give primacy to the vision of the oppressed.

These… histories of women of the working class, of Africans and African Americans, of South Asians and of all colonized peoples… are efforts to calculate and redress the high cost of a history predicated on their silence and invisibility. Justas marginalization was (and is) fully political in its impetus and effects. These histories are driven by a logic which insist that all histories is imbricated with the political.20

Sixthly, the histories of relations among men and studies about men, in addition to those between men and women, have become an emerging focus of historical enquiry. This visibility of men as men is only seen when in relation to women‟s history.21Far too little is known about the social construction of manhood and masculinity hence the need to situate men‟s history in an explication of the sex/gender systems.22

This new genre of men‟s history which has brought a woman-centred view to the study of homosexuality and has enabled a much fuller discussion of the construction of gender has been influenced by the path-breaking work of Eve Kosofsky Sedqwick.23Perspectives gained from men‟s studies according to advocates24 will help female scholarship reach its fullest potential, although there have been doubts about men sharing women‟s standpoints on them. Jeff Hearn has encouraged that

these women‟s viewpoints are critical in critiquing men‟s social practises25 while Michael Messner and Sabo have described the emerging feminist study of men and masculinity as “one that should aim at developing an analysis of men‟s problems and limitations compassionately yet within the context of a feminist critique of male privilege.26

Challenges of Women History

One of the major challenges facing women‟s history is the strategy of viewing women and men historically through separate spheres/perspective. This has been questioned for its tendency to emphasize differences rather than elucidating the reciprocity between gender and society27 But this perspective of viewing men and women through a separate sphere has proved useful in helping histories to move the history of women into the realm of analytical history, especially when the perspective helps to fill up the dearth of women‟s history.

This separate sphere‟s has also helped in the examination of ideologies oppress women, investigate female cultures created by women to support each other as well as to explore the nature of the boundaries of those sphere‟s that were expected to be observed by women. This challenge becomes tenable since “the growing acceptance of the word „gender‟ and its use as an analytical category among histories of women may, unfortunately sanction the study of masculinity before the study of feminity … let alone the history of women-is anywhere near complete.”28 Other women studies supporters have been concerned that the addition of men‟s studies might encourage a de-politicization of grassroots feminism underlying women‟s studies.29

The second challenge centres‟ around how the voices of „other women‟- different classes, races and ethnicity can be recovered and how the evidences of their experiences should be interpreted. This issue of representation is especially problematic as a number of women‟s historians feel compelled to ask who is entitled to speak on behalf of women of different classes, races and ethnicity. While Joan Scott suggest that evidence should be seen as “at once always already an interpretation and something that needs to be interpreted,”30since these evidence or giving voices especially using such techniques as interviews and oral history has helped the participant to describe the world as perceived, SheringGorelick explains that this has its own limitations as ”it may remain confined within their perceptions and thus not be able to provide them with much that they do not already know.31

The Relevance of Women History to African History

Until recently, African history has been „male-stream‟ as historians preoccupied themselves with political histories especially themes that discussed war and battles and the celebration of great men in African history.32 Women were largely invisible or misrepresented in mainstream history and were they appeared, they were mentioned in footnotes. Paul Tiyamba Zeleza summed it this way:

The authors of African history differ in their approaches and research methods, in the subjects they examine, the interpretations they advance and in their ideological outlook. But they have two things in common, they are predominantly male and sexiest in so far as their text underestimates the important role that women have played in all aspects of African history. In more extreme cases, women are not even mentioned at all, or if they are, they arediscussed in their stereotypical reproductive roles as wives and mothers. The language used often inferiorises the women activities or experiences being described.

Also women‟s lives are usually cloaked in a veil of timelessness, the institutions in which their lives are discussed, such as marriage, are seen as static. In viewing them as unchanging, as guardians of some ageless traditions, women are reduced to trans-historical creatures outside the dynamics of historical development.33

The relative underdevelopment of women‟s history in Africa at a time when it had started campaigning for a space in university curriculums in the West is attributed to several factors. Firstly, the argument that "compared with the histories of many other parts of the world, the writing of the history of Africans itself is a fairly recent development."34Secondly, historical reconstruction between 1950‟s to 1980‟s was dominated by three paradigms, nationalist school, underdevelopment or dependency school and the Marxist school.

The last three decades has seen the growth of literature on African women. This interest particularly in women‟s history is as a result of the widening horizons of historical epistemology and research and the new approaches to social history. These new approaches are helping women historian of African stock with "restoring women to history and restoring our histories to women."35 Although, the numbers of those working on women history is gradually increasing, it is worthy of note that gone are the days when African women "were painted with the brush of exotica and seen as a monolithic group…cloaked in veils of „traditions‟ from which they were gradually liberated by „modernity,‟ for the concepts tradition and modernity have been exposed for their a historical and ethnocentrism,"36 This liberation is critical not just for women history or the discipline, but for the whole of Africa since it has been shown by historians like T. O. Ranger and M. Chanock37that many of values and practises which are considered traditional today including those in the sphere of gender relations were invented during the colonial period.

The themes that women histories in Africa give attention to are varied as the methodology is inter-disciplinary. While re-examining as historical processes themes like kinship, marriage, fertility, sexuality and religious which had pre-occupied anthropologist, there are also researches on the development of women‟s cultures, solidarity network and autonomous social spaces.

In economic sphere, the importance of women‟s economic activities in agriculture, processing, craft and manufacturing and trade is being brought to the fore as women‟s contribution to development. Politically, researches are showing that women actively participated in pre-colonial politics, both as rulers and within arenas viewed as female province and indirectly as mothers, wives, sisters and daughters of powerful men. In the colonial period, women actively participated in nationalist struggle either as organized groups against colonial policies inimical to their interest or they joined male led nationalist movement. Militarily, women participated both as individuals accompanying male troops and as groups of actual combatants; a case in point is the amazons of Dahomey.

In terms of periodization, the pre-colonial history of women before 1800 suffers a dearth. Some of the historiography in this period has been summed up by Paul Zeleza38 under regions for coherence. For the west coast and its hinterland, the literature has dwelt on women‟s active participation in trade, production, state formation and increased social stratification among women; the literature on eastern and southern has featured the roles of women in production and the roles queen mothers, marriage and kinship systems; Western Sudan focuses on political roles played by women leaders such as Queen Amina, the impact of Islam on gender division of labour and women‟s position in the society and the

growth of women‟s slavery with the expansion with the expansion of trans-Saharan slave trade.39

As African history enters the nineteenth century, we see more volumes with richer analysis written on women. In eastern and southern Africa we see Works that demonstrate how Basotho women‟s production roles, economic autonomy, property rights and household relations are transformed as a result of the adoption of new technologies such as the plough.40On the other hand, in southern Mozambique, southern Tswana, Southern Malawi and the Maasai, commodity production which sometimes included slave trade, appears to have facilitated the subordination of women in this societies.41

For western Africa the important roles of Asante queen mothers in the nineteenth century is brought to the fore as well as the biography of a remarkable woman in Asante, while in Mende, female solidarity enabled some women to become chiefs and exercise political control.42In the context of gender relations, the Senegambia region from the mid nineteenth century shows that the intensification of agriculture production was both a social and gendered process while in Igbo society there was changing construction of gender and sex roles.43Women‟s urbanization during this period was also explored especially in relation to changing forms of marriage, social status and their access to landed property, capital and labour.44 Themes around the development of seclusion in Hausa land before and after the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate as well as during and after the colonial period and the emergence of intellectually inclined Fulani women during the Jihads also comes to the fore in this period.45

The twentieth century history of women interrogates the imposition of colonial rule and its effects on African women. While many elite women lost their control over trade, others took advantage of the expanding petty commodity markets. Esther Boserup46 has particularly demonstrated how the expansion of cash crop production and male labour migrations increased women‟s workload, while at the same time, their ability to appropriate the produces of their labour declined. The negative effects of migrants labour on women was especially evident in Sothern Africa.47 These developments created tensions and the colonial state responded by tightening customary laws which resulted in changes in family structures and created new forms of power.48Although the impacts were not the same for all women, “colonial patriarchal ideologies combined with indigenous patriarchal ideologies tended to re enforce women‟s subordination, exploitation and oppression.”

The next theme in this period focuses on the specific resistance to colonial rule by women such as the Aba Women‟s War in Nigeria, the Anlu Women‟s Uprising in the Cameroons and the spontaneous uprisings in Southern Africa against apartheid, to generalanalysis of women‟s involvement in nationalist struggles like the Mau Mauand labour movement and struggles.

Post-colonial women‟s history has tended to investigate women‟s position and status with independence. Economically, studies in this period show that with independence, women‟s rural production has become more commoditized as women have increasingly resorted to petty trading and wage labour to make ends meet.50

In the urban areas focus on women activities demonstrates women‟s presence in trade and informal sector operators. Women in wage labour are on the increase due to access to education, changes in family structures, economic expansion and their struggle for independence. But their positions in low paying service jobs have caused them to juggle with the burden of the double day.51

Politically, studies show that despite their contributions to nationalist struggles culminating in independence, women have been excluded and marginalized from the political process. These histories also demonstrate that until quite recently, most governments and international aid organization focused on men in their development projects. The growth of women in development based organizations is yet to correct this anomaly since vast majority of politically marginalized and economically exploited people in Africa are women. But the struggles as individuals and collectively against women exploitation, oppression and marginalization continues while efforts are on to push open the doors of economic, political, social and cultural empowerment.52

The analysis above shows that much work has been done to recover women‟s history but much more needs to be done if women‟s history must be visible. This will mean penetrating councils that design syllabuses for primary, secondary and tertiary education. This will mean that in addition to books, articles, monographs for use at the university, new course books must be published for schools. The major challenge has been to incorporate these recovered women‟s history into the mainstream of African historical studies. But this challenge will need the collaboration of both female and male historians who are committed to a deeper and broader understanding of the human past than is possible to using the traditional and conventional andro-centric paradigms since

Women‟s history represents a field of production which has its own history formed by both the politics of women liberation and intellectual developments within history and in associated disciplines and that there are methodological frameworks that are specific to women‟s history and women‟s studies in general.53

Conclusion

The analysis above shows how real and permanent women history is since it is no more permissible to write African history as his-story. The emergence of this genre in history has led to the challenge of conventional interpretations and the emergence of other genres.

Like it has been noted
both on an empirical and theoretical level, one of the most exciting historical specializations today and by its very existence is instrumental in deconstructing mainstream historiography. by emphasizing the other side of history, women instead of men, the implicit male perspective historiography that has obliterated women becomes explicit. This process is pivoting the centre of dominant historiography. It exposes normative and expressive rules of both historical writing and teaching.54

The truth is that history as written and perceived up to now, is the history of a minority since with the emergence of women history, the majority found its past. Only a new history firmly based on this recognition and equally concerned with men and women can lay claim to being a truly universal history. In order to write a new history worthy of the name, her-story and his-tory must make up history.

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KARL POPPER'S 'CRITICAL RATIONALISM' IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENTIFIC

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ABSTRACT

This study examines Karl Popper"s critical rationalism in philosophy of science and its implications for the growth of knowledge and scientific practice. Science has actually improved and is still improving the condition of human existence in the universe through its discoveries, inventions, unique explanation of phenomena as well as prediction of events in the universe. Philosophy extends its rational and reflective inquiry to the method and practice of scientific investigation, and this actually is the domain of philosophy of science. Philosophers of science employ different approaches to the investigation of scientific assumptions. Karl Popper argues that „critical rationalism" is the right approach in philosophy of science. Though critical attitude is basic in every philosophical investigation, Karl Popper"s application of it in philosophy of science is quite remarkable. This study examines precisely Karl Popper"s „critical rationalism" in philosophy of science, and argues that such has led to the improvement of human knowledge and scientific practice. This improvement in the practice of science leads to more falsifiable theories and more credible scientific inventions which promote human condition of existence in the universe. With Popper"s critical rationalism in philosophy of science, it becomes obvious that no scientific theory is immuned from criticism and none should be seen as a dogma. This study maintains that critical attitude improves man"s understanding of the universe in which he lives, and consequently improves human condition of existence in the world.

INTRODUCTION

Karl Popper is one of the renowned and most influential philosophers of science. He contributed immensely towards the development of philosophy of science. His ideas in philosophy of science are very interesting and thought-provoking. Popper values greatly the critical attitude in philosophy, and this explains why he adopted „critical rationalism" as his basic approach in philosophy of science. According to Nickolas Dykes: "Popper regarded a critical attitude as the most important virtue a philosopher could possess."1 He equates the rational attitude with the critical attitude. Thus, Popper insists that philosophers in general and philosophers of science in particular cannot do without such method. Thus, he argues consistently that every scientific theory, properly called, ought to be falsifiable. The fundamental questions are: What is critical rationalism? How did Karl Popper apply it in philosophy of science? Has Karl Popper"s critical rationalism in philosophy of science any contribution to make towards improving human knowledge and scientific practice? This study employs basically hermeneutical method of philosophical enquiry to examine Karl Popper"s critical rationalism in philosophy of science, and argues that Popper"s critical attitude has contributed immensely towards the improvement of human knowledge and the practice of scientific investigations. Obviously, this study lies within the domain of philosophy of science. Hence, it seems to the researcher that the first part of this study should focus at a brief examination of the major concern of philosophy of science.

THE DOMAIN OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Philosophy, as a discipline, extends its rational and reflective investigation into every aspect of reality of which science occupies a prominent position. Hence, philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that critically examines the methods, practices and assumptions of science. Philip S. Kitcher describes it as "the study, from a philosophical perspective, of the elements of scientific inquiry".2In a similar way, Oskar Blakstad statesthat it has to do with "the study of assumptions, foundations and implications of science."3Philosophy of Science investigates and analyzes the practices and methods of scientific investigations. It subjects the procedures and results of scientific investigations to rational scrutiny and analysis. Hence, rational inquiry into science becomes the proper domain as well as the major concern of philosophy of science.

Science offers a systematic and unique explanation of the universe through observation and experimentation. Science has contributed immensely towards improving human condition in the universe through its unique explanation of the universe, predictions, inventions and discoveries. It has led to man‟s increased understanding of the universe. For instance, before Nicholas Copernicus came up with heliocentric astronomy which made us to understand that the sun is at the centre of the universe, while the earth and other planets orbitthe sun; geocentric astronomy propounded by Ptolemy was in vogue. It is obvious that Copernican revolution led to increased understanding of the universe. Science has made important predictions of environmental hazards like earthquake, volcanic eruption, desert enchroachment etc, the knowledge of which prevented the destruction of human lives.Through scientific knowledge as well as its practical expression in technology, many sophisticated equipments have been manufactured in different facets of life, and these have improved human condition in the universe. Scientific ideas are enshrined in scientific theories.

The assumptions of science as well as the method of scientific investigation have attracted serious philosophical attention. Philosophers have investigated and are still investigating into scientific assumptions and the procedure of scientific research. Philosophers of science have adopted different approaches in examining the activities of science. Hence, there are different approaches in philosophy of science. Paul Fereyaband opted for anarchism in this regard. Thomas Samuel Kuhn adopted historical approach, and emphasized on the historical context of scientific discovery. He argued that history of science is of great importance in philosophy of science. However, Karl Popper argued that „critical rationalism‟ ought to be the correct approach in philosophy of science. Thus, Karl Popper‟s critical rationalism in philosophy of science is the focus of this study. However, the fundamental question is this: what is „critical rationalism‟? The response to this pertinent question is very necessary because a good understanding of „critical rationalism‟ enables one to appreciate the discussions in this study.

KARL POPPER‟S CRITICAL RATIONALISM: AN ANALYSIS

Karl Popper‟s basic approach in philosophy of science is known as critical rationalism. This approach sees criticism of theories and ideologies as the major function of philosophy. Thus, philosophy is conceived as a critical activity. As was already demonstrated in this study, Karl Popper values very immensely critical attitude, and insists that every philosophershould employ such method in his investigation of reality. Karl Popper emphasizes on „critical rationalism‟ which "urges us to submit our theories to severely critical tests."4 It entails examining and disclosing the weaknesses as well as the strengths of a theory or an idea. It also involves questioning every idea or theory and not adopting any theory or idea as a dogma. Thus, one has to subject one‟s idea or theory to severe criticisms. Critical

rationalism is an effort to overthrow one‟s theory and those of others. With this approach, no idea or theory should be seen as final. Hence, knowledge becomes a guess work, a form of trial and error. In the words of Karl Popper:

The point is that, whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it. Few of us, unfortunately, practice this precept; but other people, fortunately, will supply the criticism for us if we fail to supply it ourselves. Yet criticism will be fruitful only if we state our problem as clearly as we can and put our solution in a sufficiently definite form—a form in which it can be critically discussed.5

With Popper‟s critical attitude, no idea or theory is immuned from criticism. It subjects every system or ideology to severe criticism. Criticism becomes the central focus of Karl Popper‟s critical rationalism in Philosophy of science. Analyzing Karl Popper‟s critical attitude, Nickolas Dykes states:

A critical attitude, particularly a self-critical one, is also every bit as important as Popper thought it was, even if he did not always exercise his own. Subjecting one‟s pet theories to the kind of penetrating analysis Popper was so good at is the healthiest mental activity one can undertake.6

Critical rationalism is basically anti-dogmatic in nature, and it is rooted in Popper‟s falsifiability principle. Popper employed falsifiability criterion as a means of demarcating between science and pseudo-science. Thus, he classified Sigmund Freud‟s psychoanalytic theory and Karl Marx‟s theory of history as pseudo-science because they are unfalsifiable.Every scientific theory must be falsifiable and thus must be open to criticism. More detailed attention would be given to this in the later part of this study. Popper‟s critical rationalismentails one‟s readiness to overthrow one‟s theory rather than trying to defend such theory. Popper argues that one must be eager to discover the weaknesses of one‟s idea. In the words of Darrell P. Rowbottom: “Popper repeatedly emphasized the significance of a critical attitude, and a related method, for scientists.”7 Hence, this study attempts at examining the implications of Karl Popper‟s critical rationalism in philosophy of science for the improvement of knowledge and scientific practice.

KARL POPPER‟S APPLICATION OF CRITICAL RATIONALISM (CRITICAL ATTITUDE) IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

This section of the study focuses on the identification and analysis of the instances of Karl Popper‟s application of critical rationalistic approach in philosophy of science. Karl Popper employed this approach in his philosophy especially in his political philosophy and philosophy of science. In his political philosophy, Karl Popper criticized all forms of totalitarian, closed and dogmatic society. He criticized the ideas and theories of Plato, Marx and Hegel in this regard. Precisely, Popper criticized Plato‟s political theory especially his concept of justice in the state as being totalitarian and anti-humanitarian. He then advocated for an open society that is characterized by openness to criticism and anti-dogmatism. In the domain of philosophy of science, Karl Popper basically employed such approach; and this actually is the central focus of this section of the study.

Karl Popper is one of the renowned and influential philosophers of science in the contemporary era. Let us at this juncture examine some instances of Popper‟s application of critical approach in philosophy of science. With his basic approach enshrined in critical rationalism, Popper questioned a lot of issues in

the practice of science. He criticized the use of induction in scientific investigation. Induction is basically empirical in nature. It entails making general conclusions as a result of few observed instances. Popper acknowledged the fact that inductive method has been the method of empirical sciences. In his very influential book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he states:

According to a widely accepted view—to be opposed in this book—the empirical sciences can be characterized by the fact that they use „inductive methods', as they are called. According to this view, the logic of scientific discovery would be identical with inductive logic, i.e. with the logical analysis of these inductive methods. It is usual to call an inference „inductive" if it passes from singular statements (sometimes also called „particular" statements), such as accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories. 8

The inductive method, which has to do with moving from observed instances to general conclusion, remained unquestioned in the scientific world until the time of Karl Popper who challenged and criticized the use of inductive method in scientific investigation. He insists that induction is unjustifiable and its principle is logically inconsistent. According to him:

Now it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.9

From Popper"s criticism of inductive method, it became fashionable to argue that inductive generalization may not be as conclusive as some scientists take it to be. However, it ought to be noted that Popper"s critique of inductive method as well as its subsequent replacement with „deductive testing of theories" has its inherent problem, the analysis of which is outside the scope of this study. Our concern here is to examine his critical as well as anti-dogmatic approach which brings about the growth of knowledge.

Critical rationalistic approach of Karl Popper is also very explicit in his rejection of logical positivists" verifiability principle, and its subsequent replacement with falsifiability principle. Logical positivists were foundational scholars in philosophy of science. They rejected metaphysics as meaningless and maintained that a statement is meaningful, and thus scientific if it can be empirically verified. Popper criticized Logical positivists" verifiability principle as the major principle of science. In the words Popper:

…positivists, in their anxiety to annihilate metaphysics, annihilate natural science along with it. For scientific laws, too, cannot be logically reduced to elementary statements of experience. If consistently applied, Wittgenstein"s criterion of meaningfulness rejects as meaningless those natural laws the search for which, as Einstein says, is „the supreme task of the physicist": they can never be accepted as genuine or legitimate statements.10

Popper"s critical attitude in philosophy of science is very remarkable in his rejection of the logical positivists" verification principle. Having rejected the verifiability principle, Popper came up with his principle of falsifiability. As was already demonstrated in this study, Popper made a distinction between science and pseudo- science; and insists that a scientific theory must be falsifiable. Hence,any theory

that is not falsifiable is not a scientific theory. We have to note that a theory is falsifiable if it has inherent capability of being proved to be true or false and it has the capability of "being tested by experience."11 A falsifiable theory ought to be open to criticism and ought to be anti-dogmatic. Philosophers of science ought to be selfcritical, and be conscious of the fact that a particular scientific theory may be overthrown by a more falsifiable theory. Criticism plays prominent role in this regard because it is criticism that can lead to the falsification of the existing theory. Popper is very much aware of the fact that his falsifiability principle would also be subjected to severe criticism by other scholars. Thus, he argues:

Again, the attempt might be made to turn against my own criticism of the inductivist criterion of demarcation; for it might seem that objections can be raised against falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation similar to those which I myself raised against verifiability.12

Critical rationalistic approach brings to our consciousness that no theory is immuned from criticism no matter how good and successful the theory seems to be. In the domain of scientific progress or development, Popper‟s critical rationalistic approach is very evident. Karl Popper argues that science progresses or develops by the falsification of the prevailing scientific theory by a more falsifiable theory. He made it very clear that no scientific theory could be seen as a dogma. Thus, every scientific theory is only a „conjecture‟ which is to be held tentatively until it is refuted by another one. According to him:

On the scientific level, the tentative adoption of a new conjecture or theory may solve one or two problems, but it invariably opens up many new problems; for a new revolutionary theory functions exactly like a new and powerful sense organ. If the progress is significant then the new problems will differ from the old problems: the new problems will be on a radically different level of depth. This happened, for example, in relativity; it happened in quantum mechanics;and it happens right now most dramatically, in molecular biology. In each of these cases, new horizons of unexpected problems were opened up by the new theory.13

Science progresses by refuting the existing theory. His idea of scientific development is against logical positivists‟ cumulative conception of scientific development. It cannot just be conceived as the addition of new truth to the old ones. For him, scientific discoveries are actually revolutionary, but are open to further investigations and criticisms. Popper further argues:

Thus they become objects outside ourselves: objects open to investigation. As a consequence, they are now open to criticism. Thus we can get rid of a badly fitting theory before the adoption of the theory makes us unfit to survive: by criticizing our theories we can let our theories die in our stead. This is of course immensely important.14

It becomes obvious from Popperian perspective that we cannot do without criticism in the conception of scientific development. Hence, scientific progress depends on "a revolutionary use of trial and the elimination of error by criticism, which includes severe empiricalexaminations or tests; that is, attempts to probe into the possible weaknesses of theories, attempts to refute them."15 Knowledge becomes a case of trial and error. The implication of this is that scientific progress or development can be said to have no end. Informed by Popper‟s critical attitude, he describes scientific progress thus:

First, in order that a new theory should constitute a discovery or a step forward it should conflict with its predecessor; that is to say, it should lead to at least some conflicting results. But this means, from a logical point of view, that it should contradict its predecessor: it should overthrow it.16

This brings out very clearly the revolutionary nature of scientific progress. However, progress in science can be assessed rationally because there exists criterion for assessing competing theories. Popper‟s critical rationalism is against dogmatism in philosophy of science. Thus, no theory should be seen as a dogma in the course of scientific development. In fact, the critical attitude sees dogmatism as an obstacle to scientific progress. In the words of Popper:

Intolerant dogmatism, however, is one of the main obstacles to science. Indeed, we should not only keep alternative theories alive by discussing them, but we should systematically look for new alternatives; and we should be worried whenever there are no alternatives—whenever a dominant theory becomes too exclusive.17

New ideas should be considered as very important and should be carefully nurtured even when they seem awkward. The point Popper is trying to put across is that new ideas should not be suppressed because of their newness or because they contradict the prevailing one.This is the emphasis of Karl Popper‟s critical rationalism in philosophy of science

Furthermore, Popper exhibited his critical and his anti-dogmatic approach in his critique of Thomas Kuhn‟s distinction between normal science and revolutionary science. Normal science, for Kuhn, is when the members of a scientific community pay allegiance to the prevailing paradigm, while revolutionary science is when the prevailing paradigm isquestioned as a result of crisis, and subsequently replaced by a new paradigm. In criticizing Kuhn‟s distinction, Popper argues that “the distinction between these two kinds of enterprise is perhaps not quite as sharp as Kuhn makes it”18 Obviously, Popper saw Kuhn‟s normal science as dogmatic, and so was not comfortable with it. This is as a result of the fact that Kuhn‟s normal science is against critical rationalistic approach of Karl Popper. Criticizing Kuhn‟s normal science, Popper argues:

I believe, and so do many others, that all teaching on the University level (and if possible below) should be training and encouragement in critical thinking. The „normal‟ scientist, as described by Kuhn, has been badly taught. He has been taught in a dogmatic spirit: he is a victim of indoctrination. He has learned a technique which can be applied without asking for the reason why (especially in quantum mechanics)19

As was earlier demonstrated in this study, dogmatism impedes scientific progress and knowledge in general. This explains why Popper perceives an uncritical and dogmatic attitude as a great danger to science and civilization. Science ought to be critical in approach. In the words of Popper: “I believe that science is essentially critical; that it consists of bold conjectures, controlled by criticism, and that it may, therefore, be described as revolutionary.”20 It becomes obvious from Popper‟s specification that we cannot do without criticisms in science, and the aim of scientific progress is to “find theories which, in the light of critical discussion, get nearer to the truth.”21

There are other instances of Karl Popper‟s application of critical rationalism in philosophy of science, but it seems to the researcher that the ones articulated above are quite enough to substantiate the claim of this study. In this discussion on Karl Popper‟s critical rationalism, one must not fail to make reference to Immanuel Kant, who in fact popularized and launched formally the era of „critical philosophy‟ in the modern period of philosophy. Kant‟s critical philosophy was an attempt to discredit the efforts of the metaphysicians who employed human reason beyond the realm it can attain certain knowledge. Thus, Kant subjected human reason to severe criticisms in order to specify its limits as a cognitive faculty. Karl Popper acknowledged Kant‟s critical attitude in philosophy. According to Popper: "…the critical rationalism (and also the critical empiricism) which I advocate merely puts the finishing touch to Kant‟s own critical philosophy." 22 At this juncture, let us examine the implications of Popper‟s critical rationalism for the growth of knowledge and scientific practice.

IMPLICATIONS OF KARL POPPER‟S CRITICAL RATIONALISM FOR THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE

Karl Popper‟s critical rationalism has inculcated the spirit of hard-work among scientists and philosophers of science. Thus, no scientific achievement or discovery can be seen as final. It is only a „conjecture‟ in Popperian terminology which can be refuted later. This contributes immensely to the development of both speculative and practical knowledge. Critical attitude sharpens human intellect and enables man to develop his potentials. Itimproves one‟s thinking ability and keeps one‟s rationality fully alert. Without criticism, human knowledge remains stagnant. Thus, Karl Popper‟s critical attitude in philosophy of science has led to the growth of knowledge. This growth in knowledge brings about better understanding of the universe, and better utilization of natural endowments. Human condition of existence in the universe actually improves when man has good understanding of the universe. This lessens the problems man encounters in the universe. Also, it leads to the development of human potentials in every aspect of human endeavour. Attesting to this, Ben O. Ebo states:

In fact, our thoughts constitute our authentic being in our responsible decisions and in our profound significance both theoretically and practically. And so what we are as human beings is, to some extent, determined by how much we are able to penetrate the truth of reality with our thought. Man‟s being is diminished or increased depending on "quantity" and "quality" of truth he possesses." 23

Critical attitude enables one to attain deeper knowledge of the universe. As man possesses deeper knowledge of the universe, man functions better in the universe and makes optimum use of the universe in which he finds himself. Critical attitude plays irreplaceable role in the development of human intellect. Obviously, when the human intellect is well developed, it is ripe and ready for high quality inventions and discoveries which consequently improve human condition of existence in the universe. Critical rationalism eliminates, as much as possible, mediocrity as well as unthinking attitude. Thus, it enables man to perform his intellectual role as a rational being. This brings about intellectual satisfaction as well as fulfillment, and gives man the opportunity to be authentic to his nature as a rational being.Critical attitude enables one to develop intellectually, and enables one to acknowledge one‟s limitations. Popper‟s critical rationalism in philosophy of science enables one to be open to criticism, and anyone who is open to criticism will not see one‟s idea or point of view as conclusive, but rather as a contribution which is not without limitations, and which may be overthrown by another one in future.

Popper‟s critical rationalism in philosophy of science plays prominent role in the improvement of the practice of scientific investigation. This improvement in the practice of science leads to more credible scientific inventions which promote human condition of existence in the world. It also influences the quality of theories being propounded by scientists. Critical attitude has made scientists and philosophers of science to be more meticulous in the formulation of theories, bearing in mind that every theory or idea has to face severe criticism. It has led to the elimination of carelessly formulated theories.Furthermore, it brings to consciousness that scientific discoveries have no end. Thus, no one can claim to have a final word with regard to this. Any discovery or invention one makes remains tentative. This brings about the spirit of perseverance among scientists and philosophers of science.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Attempts have been made in this study to examine Karl Popper‟s critical attitude or critical rationalism in philosophy of science and its implications for growth of knowledge and scientific practice. As it is obvious from the discussion, Popper insists that critical rationalism is the best approach philosophers should apply in their investigations of realities. This study also analyzed some instances of Karl Popper‟s application of such approach in philosophy of science. The researcher quite agrees with Popper that that the critical rationalism ought to be the right approach in philosophy of science. This agrees with the nature of philosophy in general which is basically a rational enterprise. It is in the nature of philosophy to be critical in approach, and such criticality has been very influential in improving human condition of existence in different domains of human life in the universe. Criticism leads to rational explanation of the phenomena in the universe as against mythological explanation prior to the emergence of formal philosophy. Philosophers apply critical attitude in one way or the other in their philosophical investigations. However, Karl Popper‟s application of such is quite remarkable, and this explains why he adopted critical rationalism as his distinctive approach in philosophy of science. As it is obvious in this study, Popper‟s critical attitude in philosophy of science has led to the improvement of human knowledge as well as scientific practice. It might seem that Popper laid too much emphasis on the critical attitude as some would argue. Obviously, such approach is necessary for the improvement of human knowledge and scientific practice as demonstrated in this study. However, it ought to be noted that critical attitude should not be focusless. It should always be focused and aimed at improving human condition of existence in the universe.

ENDNOTES

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